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We	show	that	the	eclectic	"Boogaloo"	extremist	movement	that	is	now	rising	to	prominence	in	
the	U.S.,	has	a	hidden	online	mathematical	order	that	is	identical	to	ISIS	during	its	early	
development,	despite	their	stark	ideological,	geographical	and	cultural	differences.	The	
evolution	of	each	across	scales	follows	a	single	shockwave	equation	that	accounts	for	individual	
heterogeneity	in	online	interactions.	This	equation	predicts	how	to	disrupt	the	onset	and	
'flatten	the	curve'	of	such	online	extremism	by	nudging	its	collective	chemistry.	
	Disrupting	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	potentially	violent	extremist	movements	is	a	crucial	challenge.	In	recent	months,	Facebook	has	designated	the	new	U.S.	Boogaloo	movement	a	violent	anti-government	network	and	dangerous	organization1,	U.S.	Congress	has	been	alerted	to	potential	Boogaloo	violence2,	and	a	Boogaloo	member	has	been	arrested	for	the	death	of	a	federal	officer3.	The	Boogaloo	movement	came	to	prominence	in	the	U.S.	through	Facebook	in	2020,	with	a	highly	diverse	mix	of	narratives	ranging	from	Second	Amendment	gun	rights	and	Black	Lives	Matter	racism	through	to	COVID-19	lockdown	protests	and	upcoming	U.S.	elections,	with	members	drawn	from	across	conservative,	libertarian	and	nihilistic	ideologies.	By	contrast,	ISIS	(Islamic	State)	is	a	pro-jihad,	anti-U.S.	movement	whose	significant	growth	in	2015	developed	outside	the	U.S.	on	central	European	platforms	such	as	VKontakte	(see	Supplementary	Material	SM).	These	movements	vary	dramatically	in	terms	of	their	evolution,	ideology,	goals,	geography	and	drivers	such	as	political	grievances,	poverty	and	personality	traits4,5,6.	Existing	extremism	research	has	addressed	such	features	in	detail	with	great	success4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16.	Our	focus	provides	a	complementary,	system-level	understanding	that	yields	fresh	quantitative	insight	into	their	evolution	and	possible	interventions.		Given	these	many	features	and	differences,	it	is	not	expected	that	the	Boogaloo	and	ISIS	movements	would	possess	any	deep	mathematical	order	or	that	it	would	be	shared	by	both.		Indeed,	each	evolves	very	differently	over	time,	both	internally	(Fig.	1A,B)	and	as	a	whole	(Fig.	2).	However,	we	find	that	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	each	follows	the	predictions	of	a	single	shockwave	equation,	both	at	the	level	of	the	individual	communities	within	each	movement	(Fig.	1A,B)	and	across	movements	(Fig.	2).	The	key	feature	of	our	mathematical	theory,	which	we	illustrate	in	Fig.	1C	and	derive	in	the	SM,	is	that	it	incorporates	individual	human	heterogeneity	into	the	online	aggregation	process.	The	heterogeneity	of	each	individual	!	is	mimicked	by	a	vector	"⃗! 	which	can	be	of	arbitrary	complexity	(i.e.	any	number	of	dimensions)	and	can	in	principle	change	over	time.	This	results	in	heterogeneity-dependent	interactions	between	individuals	which,	when	averaged	over	all	pairs,	gives	a	value	$.	How	online	communities	emerge	and	evolve,	then	depends	on	this	collective	online	'chemistry'.			
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Fig.	1.	A	and	B:	Growth	curves	of	online	Boogaloo	communities	(each	is	a	Facebook	Page	whose	size	is	the	number	of	
members)	and	online	ISIS	communities	(each	is	a	VKontakte	Group	whose	size	is	the	number	of	members).	Their	
empirical	growths	(symbols)	differ	and	occur	over	different	timescales,	yet	they	follow	the	same	mathematical	
equation	that	incorporates	individual	user	heterogeneity	into	the	online	social	aggregation	process	(solid	lines).	For	
visual	clarity,	only	a	few	of	the	communities	are	shown	in	the	main	plots.	Our	data	collection	follows	previous	
work17,18,19,20,21	and	focuses	on	communities	(Pages,	Groups)	since	these	play	a	greater	role	in	nurturing	narratives	
than	platforms	like	Twitter	which	have	no	pre-built	community	tool.	C:	Schematic	of	our	mathematical	theory	
showing	predicted	onset	times	for	example	F	values	(see	SM).	D:	Predicted	curves	from	our	theory	(arbitrary	units)	
show	how	onset	can	be	delayed	and	the	curve	flattened	by	nudging	F	and	hence	nudging	the	collective	chemistry.		
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Our	mathematical	theory	of	aggregation-with-heterogeneity	(Fig.	1C)	makes	specific	predictions:		(1)	There	is	a	single	equation	that	governs	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	each	individual	extremist	community	(Fig.	1A,B)	and	also	an	entire	extremist	movement	(Fig.	2A,B).	It	is	a	generalized	shockwave	equation	"ℇ"$ = "ℇ"% &'( &ℇ( − 1)	where	$	and	*	measure	the	heterogeneity	and	user	pool	size	for	individual	communities	(Fig.	1)	or	an	entire	movement	(Fig.	2),	and	ℇ = ∑ ./)0%)()*+ .		(2)	The	size	of	each	community	(Fig.	1)	and	the	entire	movement	(Fig.	2)	is	predicted	to	vary	in	time	as	1(3) = * &1 −5 &6,&'$( 7 0"8 6,&'$( 7) / 6,&'$( 7)	where	5	is	the	Lambert	function.	(3)	Each	community	in	Fig.	1	and	the	entire	movement	in	Fig.	2,	is	predicted	to	have	its	own	tipping	point	time	3-./0$ = (&'		which	signals	the	onset	of	a	macroscopic	swell	in	online	support.	This	tipping	point	is,	in	the	limit	of	large	*,	a	dynamical	phase	transition.	(4)	The	community	size	distribution	at	the	onset	3-./0$	(see	Fig.	2	insets)	is	predicted	to	be	a	power-law	with	exponent	−5 2⁄ = −2.5.			
	
Fig.	2:	A	and	B:	Growth	curves	of	the	entire	Boogaloo	movement	(size	is	the	combined	number	of	members	of	their	
Facebook	Pages),	and	the	entire	ISIS	movement	(size	is	the	combined	number	of	members	of	their	VKontakte	
Groups).	Insets	show	distribution	of	sizes	of	the	individual	communities	at	the	predicted	onset	!!"#$%	(vertical	gray	
line	in	main	panels).	The	maximum-likelihood	estimate	for	the	power-law	exponent	in	each	case	is	−#. %	to	two	
significant	figures,	which	is	the	same	value	as	predicted	by	the	theory	(SM).		
		The	onset	times	3-./0$	and	growth	curves	1(3)	for	each	Boogaloo	community	and	ISIS	community	in	Figs.	1A,B,	and	for	the	movements	as	a	whole	in	Fig.	2A,B,	are	well	described	by	these	mathematical	predictions.	Moreover,	Fig.	2A,B	insets	show	that	the	individual	community	sizes	at	3-./0$	exhibit	the	predicted	power-law	exponent	−2.5.	Since	the	theoretical	formulae	are	derived	for	*	very	large,	the	predicted	onsets	are	too	sharp:	but	at	the	expense	of	losing	the	closed-form	formulae,	we	can	extend	the	theory	to	account	for	finite	*	as	in	the	empirical	data.	The	transition	then	becomes	smooth	like	the	empirical	data,	with	the	size	at	the	onset	varying	as	[*],+/2	as	opposed	to	being	strictly	zero.		The	inferred	membership	heterogeneity	is	similar	for	each	movement	(Figs.	2A,B)	with	both	$	values	being	statistically	indistinguishable	from	1 3⁄ = 0.33,	which	is	the	value	predicted	mathematically	for	aggregation	favoring	diversity	in	a	population	with	uniformly	distributed	{"⃗!}	(see	SM).	This	would	suggest	that	each	movement	develops	by	aggregating	diverse	sets	of	supporters	from	the	global	online	user	pool,	instead	of	some	particular	pre-polarized	population.	The	Fig.	1A	inset	shows	that	the	membership	heterogeneities	$	of	individual	Boogaloo	communities	are	also	close	to	1 3⁄ 	which	
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suggests	that	individual	Boogaloo	community	formation	is	also	driven	by	the	same	preference	for	diversity	as	the	entire	Boogaloo	movement.	This	is	consistent	with	the	eclectic	mix	of	memes	and	ideas	that	we	observe	in	the	content	of	each	Boogaloo	community,	and	the	lack	of	any	increase	in	topic	coherence	that	we	observe	from	our	dynamic	Latent	Dirichlet	Allocation	topic	analysis	of	their	narratives	(see	SM).	By	contrast,	individual	ISIS	communities	have	$	values	closer	to	2 3⁄ 	(Fig.	1B	inset)	which	suggests	that	once	inside	the	ISIS	movement,	its	supporters	form	into	communities	which	are	each	internally	homogenous	and	have	a	well-defined	narrative	flavor.	Overall,	this	suggests	that	while	Boogaloo	and	ISIS	recruits	join	the	overall	movements	driven	by	diversity,	Boogaloos	continue	with	this	diversity	driver	when	forming	and	joining	an	individual	community,	while	ISIS	supporters	prefer	a	community	to	have	a	single	narrative	flavor.		By	incorporating	the	interplay	between	individual	human	heterogeneity	and	connective	action22	online	(Figs.	1,	2),	our	mathematical	theory	has	placed	these	extremist	movements'	evolutions	on	the	same	footing	--	akin	to	a	single	equation	in	physics	explaining	the	different	trajectories	of	a	plane	taking	off	vs.	landing	in	terms	of	uplift	vs.	gravity.	While	there	will	always	be	different	trajectories	for	different	movements	and	different	communities	within	each	movement,	this	identification	of	a	shared	mathematical	order23,24,25,26,27	opens	the	door	to	a	common	set	of	mitigation	strategies.		An	immediate	example	is	the	mathematical	theory's	prediction	that	online	extremism	can	be	mitigated	by	nudging	the	online	collective	chemistry.	Slightly	decreasing	$	at	the	level	of	the	entire	movement	or		individual	communities	(Fig.	1D)	delays	the	onset	(since	3-./0$ ∝ 1 $⁄ )	and	flattens	the	growth	curve	1(3):	specifically,	−∆$ $⁄ 	= ∆3-./0$ 3-./0$⁄ .	This	could	be	achieved	by	biasing	the	interaction	of	dissimilar	individuals	such	that	aggregation	favors	dissimilar	"⃗!'s,	by	injecting	their	online	space	(e.g.	Facebook	Page)	with	more	diverse	material,	or	by	nudging	the	composition	of	the	overall	pool	of	potential	recruits	(see	SM).	Alternatively,	by	nudging	smaller	(and	hence	potentially	less	robust)	communities,	the	power-law	distribution	at	the	onset	can	be	disrupted	(see	SM)	which	in	turn	disrupts	the	dynamical	phase	transition	and	hence	delays	the	onset	of	support.	These	approaches,	while	significant	challenges	in	practice,	are	preferable	to	blanket	shutting	down	of	all	communities:	the	latter		would	rely	on	them	all	being	found,	risks	claims	of	freedom-of-speech,	and	could	ignite	new	support.				Explaining	why	the	Boogaloos	have	suddenly	emerged	requires	deeper	social,	political	and	economic	debate.	However,	our	mathematical	analysis	offers	a	quantitative	answer	by	extending	the	heterogeneity-driven	aggregation	toward	a	generalized	version	of	the	sociological	Seceder	Model	of	Dittrich	et	al.	and	Halpin-Healy	et	al.28,29,30	(Fig.	3,	SM)	which	features	a	competition	between	the	pressure	to	conform	and	the	desire	to	dissent.	Such	a	competition	is	consistent	with	the	Boogaloos'	eclectic	mix	of	fads	(e.g.	memes)	and	fashions	and	the	lack	of	any	increasing	topic	coherence	in	their	narratives	(see	SM).	This	model	correctly	predicts	the	emergence	of	3	stable	movements	(Fig.	3)	and	it	could	even	be	used	to	estimate	the	number	of	new	extremist	'branches'	to	expect	in	the	future.				
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Fig.	3.		Computer	simulation	predicts	Boogaloo	emergence	outside	the	usual	Left-Right	spectrum.	It	is	generated	by	
making	the	aggregation	in	Fig.	1C	follow	the	Seceder	mechanism	of	Dittrich	et	al.	and	Halpin-Healy	et	al.28,29,30.	We	
show	this	in	a	hybrid	two-dimensional	space	since	the	emergence	and	stability	are	general	for	many	model	variants,	
including	the	simpler	case	of	a	one-dimensional	&⃗&	which	we	used	to	generate	the	branches	shown.		Among	potential	limitations	of	our	study,	is	the	fact	that	our	mathematical	analysis	will	always	be	an	approximation	and	hence	the	theoretical	predictions	in	Figs.	1	and	2	are	not	perfect.	While	the	smooth	onset	of	the	empirical	growth	curves	can	be	reproduced	at	the	expense	of	a	loss	of	closed-form	formulae	as	discussed	earlier,	there	are	still	unexplained	bumps	and	jumps.	However,	these	can	also	be	reproduced	if	we	allow	for	an	online	influx	of	potential	recruits	and	hence	*	becomes	a	function	of	time.	We	also	need	to	study	future	extremist	movements	as	they	emerge	over	time	online,	to	check	the	generality	of	our	findings.	However,	the	Boogaloos	and	ISIS	are	certainly	movements	of	high	current	importance	--	and	the	SM	shows	that	their	hidden	mathematical	order	reported	here,	does	not	arise	for	other	online	human	aggregation	behaviors.	Finally,	we	stress	that	our	mathematical	analysis	is	targeted	at	complementing	current	analyses	in	the	social	sciences,	not	to	replace	them.	
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